Ronald Dworkin Argues that Judges are in Danger of Uncritically

Reading Passage Question

Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are in danger of uncritically embracing an erroneous theory known as legal positivism because they think that the only alternative is a theory that they (and Dworkin) see as clearly (5) unacceptable—natural law. The latter theory holds that

judges ought to interpret the law by consulting their own moral convictions, even if this means ignoring the letter of the law and the legal precedents for its interpretation. Dworkin regards this as an (10) impermissible form of judicial activism that arrogates to judges powers properly reserved for legislators.

Legal positivism, the more popular of the two theories, holds that law and morality are wholly distinct. The meaning of the law rests on social (15) convention in the same way as does the meaning of a word. Dworkin’s view is that legal positivists regard disagreement among jurists as legitimate only if it arises over what the underlying convention is, and it is

to be resolved by registering a consensus, not by (20) deciding what is morally right. In the same way, disagreement about the meaning of a word is settled by determining how people actually use it, and not by deciding what it ought to mean. Where there is no consensus, there is no legal fact of the matter. The (25) judge’s interpretive role is limited to discerning this consensus, or the absence thereof.

According to Dworkin, this account is incompatible with the actual practice of judges and lawyers, who act as if there is a fact of the matter even (30) in cases where there is no consensus. The theory he proposes seeks to validate this practice without falling into what Dworkin correctly sees as the error of natural law theory. It represents a kind of middle ground between the latter and legal positivism. Dworkin (35) stresses the fact that there is an internal logic to a society’s laws and the general principles they typically embody. An interpretation that conforms to these principles may be correct even if it is not supported by a consensus. Since these general principles may (40) involve such moral concepts as justice and fairness, judges may be called upon to consult their own moral intuitions in arriving at an interpretation. But this is not to say that judges are free to impose their own morality at will, without regard to the internal logic of the laws. (45) The positivist’s mistake, as Dworkin points out, is assuming that the meaning of the law can only consist in what people think it means, whether these people be the original authors of the law or a majority of the interpreter’s peers. Once we realize, as Dworkin does, (50) that the law has an internal logic of its own that constrains interpretation, we open up the possibility of improving upon the interpretations not only of our contemporaries but of the original authors.

“Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are in danger of uncritically” - is a GMAT reading comprehension passage with answers. Candidates need a strong knowledge of English GMAT reading comprehension.

This GMAT Reading Comprehension consists of 6 comprehension questions. The GMAT Reading Comprehension questions are designed for the purpose of testing candidates’ abilities in understanding, analyzing, and applying information or concepts. Candidates can actively prepare with the help of GMAT Reading Comprehension Practice Questions.

Solution and Explanation

  1. Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

(A) Dworkin regards natural law theory as a middle ground between legal positivism and judicial activism.
(B) Dworkin holds that judicial interpretations should not be based solely on identifying a consensus or solely on moral intuition, but should be consistent with the reasoning that underlies the law.
(C) Dworkin argues that the internal logic of the law should generally guide judges except in instances where consensus is registered or judges have strong moral intuitions.
(D) Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation is based on borrowing equally from natural law theory and legal positivism.
(E) Dworkin validates judges’ dependence on moral intuition, reason, and the intent of the authors of a law, but only in cases where a social consensus is not present.

Answer: B
Explanation: The natural law is the only theory that makes sense, they believe that legal positivism is the incorrect theory. According to the latter approach, judges should interpret the law based on their own moral principles, even if doing so means rejecting the wording of the law and the relevant legal precedents.

  1. What is the main purpose of the second paragraph?

(A) to explain why legal positivism is so popular
(B) to evaluate the theory of legal positivism
(C) to discuss how judicial consensus is determined
(D) to identify the basic tenets of legal positivism
(E) to argue in favor of the theory of legal positivism

Answer: D
Explanation: The major purpose served by the second paragraph is to highlight the basic aspects of legal positivism. It contains a number of different factors as mentioned in the paragraph; convention in the same way as does the meaning of a word. Moreover, it is also a constructive aspects of deciding what is morally right.

  1. Which one of the following most accurately characterizes the author’s attitude toward Dworkin’s theory?

(A) confident endorsement of its central assertions
(B) caution about its potential for justifying some forms of judicial activism
(C) modest expectation that some of its claims will be found to be unwarranted
(D) quiet conviction that its importance derives only from its originality
(E) enthusiasm that it will replace legal positivism as the most popular theory of legal interpretation

Answer: A
Explanation: The author concludes the by quoting that the law comprises of its own inherent logic. This further leads to interpretation and one opens the door to refine not just contemporary readings but also the interpretation of original writers.

  1. According to the passage, which one of the following is a goal of Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation?

(A) no evaluate previous legal interpretations by judges influenced by legal positivism
(B) to dispute the notion that social consensus plays any role in legal interpretation
(C) to provide a theoretical argument against the use of moral intuition in legal interpretation
(D) to argue that legal decisions must be based on the principles of the original authors of the laws
(E) to validate theoretically the method commonly used by judges in practice

Answer: E
Explanation: The more well-known of the two views, legal positivism, asserts that morality and law are totally separate. Just like the definition of a word, the meaning of the law depends on social norm. According to Dworkin, legal positivists only consider a jurist's dispute to be valid if it concerns the nature of the underlying norm. And should be settled by registering a consensus.

  1. The passage suggests that Dworkin would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements?

(A) Judges and lawyers too often act as though there is a fact of the matter in legal cases.
(B) Judges should not use their moral intuition when it conflicts with the intentions of those legislators who authored the law being interpreted.
(C) Legal positivism is a more popular theory than natural law theory because legal positivism simplifies the judge’s role.
(D) If there is consensus about how to interpret a law, then jurists should not examine the internal logic of the law being interpreted.
(E) Legal positivists misunderstand the role of moral intuition in legal interpretation.

Answer: E
Explanation: Judges may be asked to use their own moral intuitions to interpret these fundamental principles since they may touch on moral ideas like justice and fairness. This does not imply, however, that judges are allowed to enforce any moral code they want, regardless of how logically sound the laws are.

  1. It can be inferred that legal positivists, as described in the passage, agree with which one of the following statements?

(A) Judges sometimes ought to be allowed to use personal moral convictions as a basis for a legal interpretation.
(B) Disagreements about the meaning of a law are never legitimate.
(C) The ultimate standard of interpretation is the logic of the law itself, not moral intuition.
(D) The meaning of a law derives from jurists’ interpretations of that law.
(E) There is no legal fact of the matter when jurists have differing moral convictions about an issue.

Answer: D
Explanation: Judges may be asked to use their own moral intuitions to interpret these fundamental principles since they may touch on moral ideas like justice and fairness. This does not imply, however, that judges are allowed to enforce any moral code they want, regardless of how logically sound the laws are.

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